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ANTI-PELAGIANISM AND 
THE RESISTIBILITY OF GRACE 
Richard Cross 
I argue that accepting the resistibility of grace does not entail accepting either 
Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism, and offer seven models for the offer of grace 
that allow for the resistibility of grace: respectively, covenant theology, syner-
gism, and five models that posit no natural human act of acceptance (while 
allowing for natural human acts of resistance). Of these, I conclude that all but 
covenant theologies avoid serni-Pelagianism, and that all avoid Pelagianism, 
as defined at the Second Council of Orange. 
'If anyone says that a person's free will when moved and roused by God gives no 
co-operation by responding to God's summons and invitation to dispose and pre-
pare itself to obtain the grace of justification; and that it cannot, if it so wishes, dis-
sent but, like something inanimate, can do nothing at all and remains merely pas-
sive: let him be anathema.' (Council of Trent, session 6, canon 4) 
I 
In what follows, I should like to consider a variety of positions on the 
Christian doctrines of justification and grace, in an attempt to see whether 
the views I discuss can plausibly be said to avoid both Pelagianism and 
semi-Pel agi anism. What unites the various positions that I consider is the 
belief that justifying grace-justification-is resistible. Any theologian sys-
tematically committed to the irresistibility of grace eo ipso avoids 
Pelagianism. Pelagianism and the irresistibility of grace are logically 
incompatible. (This point will, I hope, become clearer in a moment, once I 
have offered a definition of 'Pelagianism.') The reason for considering the 
problem is that it is not at all obvious that it is possible to reject 
Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism, while yet holding on to the resistibility 
of grace. Calvinist theologians, in particular, are skeptical here. I hope to 
show that they should not be. Nevertheless, I shall not be interested in any 
historical figures, and my focus here is merely conceptual. I hope, howev-
er, that the considerations I offer may be of some help in trying to evaluate 
past debates, patristic, medieval, and Reformation. Finally, by way of 
introduction, I shall not be concerned with arguments for or against the 
resistibility of grace. My interest is solely in determining whether any 
view that is committed to the resistibility of grace is ipso facto Pelagian. 
First, then, relevant definitions. According to Canon 9 of the Second 
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Council of Orange (529), every good act that we do is brought about in us 
by God. In line with the Catholic tradition, I understand' good' here to 
mean "salutary," and that the view that is being condemned is that we can 
in any sense cause our own salvation. Thus, Canon 3 of the same council 
condemns the view that the grace of God "can be conferred by human 
invocation," a condemnation that (if read as synonymous with Canon 9) is 
in accord with the interpretation of 'good' I am presupposing here.1 And 
this gives us the "Pelagian" view that we somehow cause our own justifi-
cation. Note that if grace is irresistible, then we have no causal role in the 
reception of grace, and Pelagianism is thus ipso facto false. 
Canon 5 of the Council condemns the view that the beginning of faith in 
us is not through the gift of grace. And this constitutes the rejection of the 
"semi-Pelagian" view that the beginning of our justification is from us, not 
from God. The semi-Pelagian view is distinct from the Pelagian since the 
view that the beginning of our justification is from us does not entail that 
view that our justification is in any sense caused by ourselves. 
Before continuing, we should note that the issues I consider here do not 
presuppose or require any particular doctrines of justification or atone-
ment. In terms of justification, my interest is merely in how justification is 
acquired, not in what it consists in. (I use 'justification' synonymously 
with 'salvation'; this usage is not intended to imply any particular theory 
of justification.) In terms of the atonement, we should note that there is no 
obvious conceptual tie between justification and any particular theory of the 
atonement. In fact, there is no manifest conceptual tie between justification 
and atonement at all. There is no obvious conceptual reason why justifica-
tion cannot proceed quite independently of Christ's saving work. 
Traditionally, of course, justification is linked to the atonement in the sense 
that the atonement is a necessary condition for justification. Discerning 
whether or not such a claim is true is well beyond my aims here, and what-
ever conclusion were held would make no difference to my argument.' 
In what follows, I shall consider seven different views that accept the 
resistibility of grace, and assess whether the various views are able to 
avoid Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism. There are clearly more possible 
views than these, more or less Pelagian; I have made my choice with an 
eye merely on the rejection of Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism. The 
question, of course, is whether or not some view manages to avoid the 
claims that we cause our own salvation, or that we initiate our own salva-
tion. Now, it is very hard to work out what is the sufficient cause of some 
state of affairs, and almost as hard to work out what counts as the initiation 
of a process that results in a certain state of affairs. I do not attempt to pro-
vide principled reasons in favor of some analysis over another, partly 
because I am not sure that such principled reasons exist in every case. I 
rely rather on intuitions. These seem to me firm enough to bear the weight 
that I am putting on them-not least because the kinds of intuitions that I 
appeal to would, I think, be regarded as sufficient and reasonable for the 
sorts of moral judgement that we have to make in daily life (and perhaps 
even for legal purposes). But I leave the plausibility of my intuitions here 
to the reader to judge. 
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II 
First, let me begin with what is, from a soteriological point of view, the 
weakest theory: the covenant theology of some late-medievals and certain 
Arminians. The essence of this view is that God promises to justify-or at 
least to offer grace to-someone who satisfies certain minimal ethical con-
ditions. (For the medievals, the relevant condition is for a person Uto do 
what is in him" [i.e. to do the best he can]; for the Arminians, the condition 
is to lead a minimally good life.) 
Is such a view Pelagian? I doubt it. Consider the following general 
case. Person x freely promises to do action a if person y acts in way w. We 
would not, I think, say that y causes a in the case that y acts in way w. We 
would say that x causes a. So, as a case of such a promise or covenant, if 
God freely promises to justify me in the case that I satisfy certain moral 
requirements, justification is caused not by me but by God. 
There is an immediate objection to this line of reasoning. God is neces-
sarily good, and so, as a matter of necessity, keeps his promises. All other 
agents are, in principle, peccable. And it may be that the reason why we 
assume x causes a in the case that y acts in way w, even if x has promised to 
cause a in the case that y acts in way w, is that-given x's peccability-y's 
action is not sufficient for a. x could always break his promise. And it may 
be that in the case of an agent who cannot break his promise, we would 
want to claim that the cause of the ultimate effect is simply the prior 
agent-y's causing w is sufficient for x to cause a, and y is thus the ultimate 
cause ofa. 
I believe, however, that I can buttress my basic intuition here by consid-
ering how we assign blame and praise. Consider a case in which some 
agent is hard-wired in a way that prevents him from ever breaking a 
promise. The agent I have in mind, however, is not conspicuously good in 
any other way. Suppose that this agent freely promises to do a bad deed 
every time I act in accordance with an obligation of mine. It seems to me 
that I am not to blame for the bad deeds that this person causes, even if I 
am aware of the promise that he has made. And there is a reason for this. 
The agent's promise was free. He did not have to make it. It is his free 
promise that causes him to act in the way that he does, not my actions. Pari 
passu, then, it is God's free covenant that causes my salvation in this 
medieval and Arminian view. 
There is an objection that would be made to this by any card-carrying 
Calvinist. Does the view not amount to my actions' meriting justification? 
The simple answer here is, No. Forget, for the moment, about the divine 
promise. Merit would only arise in the case that my actions placed God 
under some sort of obligation to justify me, or something functionally 
equivalent to obligation.3 And-setting aside a divine promise-such an 
obligation or quasi-obligation could arise only if the nature of my actions 
were such as morally to require justification as a reward. (In such a case, a 
promise to reward the actions would be superfluous if the rewarding 
agency were necessarily good.) Still, nothing about my account thus far 
entails that the minimal requirements that need to be satisfied for justifica-
tion are such that justification is morally necessitated by them (or necessitat-
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ed in some way that does duty for moral necessitation in the case that God 
is not morally good). Consider the reward assigned on the basis of a free 
divine promise. If there is merit here at all, it is what the scholastics used 
to call merit de congruo--the appropriateness of God's rewarding an action. 
In fact we do not even need to talk of merit de congruo at all. God's promise 
could be wholly gratuitous, and nothing about my actions would have any 
intrinsic meritorious value-they would be, other than the divine promise 
to reward them, wholly valueless, and not be such as to make it even 
appropriate for God to reward them. In any case the only obligation is 
imposed by God on himself. It seems to me that there is nothing Pelagian 
about this. 
Is the covenant view that I am considering here semi-Pelagian in the 
way that I have defined this latter term? I suspect that it is, though I do not 
know of a knock-down argument to show this. Clearly, the question is: 
what initiates the process of justification in this covenant theology? There 
are two possible contenders: God's promise, and the human person's satis-
faction of the minimal moral requirements for justification. Although there 
do not seem to be any decisive arguments here, I believe nevertheless that 
a reasonably powerful case can be made to the effect that it is the human 
action, on this covenant theology, that is the initiation of justification. The 
argument considers the relationship between the promise or covenant, on 
the one hand, and the process of justification, on the other. The basic intu-
ition is that the promise is, causally, too remote from any particular 
instance of justification to count as the initiation of such an instance. The 
promise is more like a general condition for justification: it is more like the 
"machinery" of justification than a causal part in the process itself. The 
promise is a way of setting up a process of justification. But what initiates 
the process is the human action. The promise is not a particular divine 
action preveniently giving grace to a particular individual. The actual gift 
is subsequent to the individual's acting in the minimally required way.4 
An analogy may help here. Consider a machine that is used to manu-
facture sausages. The machine is a general condition for the manufacture 
of sausages. But we would not say that the mere presence of the machine 
initiates the production of a particular sausage. We would say that the 
sausage manufacturer does this when he starts the machine running. 
Analogously, then, I conclude that covenant theologies are indeed semi-
Pelagian in the sense defined. Still, I do not believe that this argument 
would be sufficient to convince someone very strongly wedded to the anti-
Pelagian structure of a covenant theology. Such a person could insist that 
God's promise counts as the initiation of every process of justification, and 
thus hold that a covenant theology is neither Pelagian nor semi-Pelagian. 
III 
The six remaining theologies that I consider all insist that the initiation of 
an individual's justification is God's active offer of grace to that individual. 
Such views, then, are by definition not semi-Pelagian. Nevertheless, since, 
on the theories I am considering here, grace is resistible, any active offer of 
grace requires some form of acceptance. This acceptance is not in any 
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sense prior to the actual particular offer of grace to any individual. 
Covenants or promises are irrelevant here. A covenant of the kind 
described above is required only if the offer of grace itself is to be made 
conditional on the satisfaction of certain minimal ethical requirements. 
Since all the views that I have in mind hold to the resistibility of grace, it 
is important to understand, as a preliminary point, that the acceptance of 
grace, provided that it consist in some positive act, cannot itself be the nec-
essary result of any divine gift. For consider acceptance on the assumption 
that it is itself a divine gift. Either this gift is resistible or not. If it is irre-
sistible, then grace is irresistible. If the gift of acceptance is resistible, then 
the gift of acceptance itself needs accepting. Consider this second-level 
acceptance. If it is an irresistible divine gift, then grace is irresistible. If it is 
resistible, then we will need another divine gift to allow us to accept it, and 
so on ad infinitum. Acceptance, therefore, cannot be a divine gift if grace is 
to be resistible, and, by the same token, anyone who holds that acceptance 
is such a gift will have to be committed to the irresistibility of grace. What 
I shall be concerned with in the rest of this short article is seeing whether it 
is possible to combine robust anti-Pelagianism with some view according 
to which the human acceptance of the offer of grace is not itself the result 
of grace (i.e. is not sufficiently caused by grace). 
The first of the six remaining views is that the acceptance of grace 
offered counts, in effect, as a work-something that the person to whom 
grace is offered actually does. Furthermore, it is a work that is entirely 
within the agent's own power, and entirely a result of the natural disposi-
tions and inclinations of the agent. Now, this work may about as minimal 
a work as can be conceived. But a work it is, its possibly minimal nature 
notwithstanding. (The work need not be minimal; presumably, its precise 
identity would be dependent wholly on a divine decision.) This would 
amount to one version of the view known to early Lutheran theologians as 
"synergism" -and vehemently rejected by such theologians as Pelagian. Is 
this Lutheran rejection correct? This largely depends on how the Pelagian 
claim is construed. If we hold that Pelagianism amounts to the claim that 
we can sufficiently save ourselves by our own actions, then the version of 
synergism that I am considering here is not Pelagian. After all, by defini-
tion synergism holds that there are two necessary and jointly sufficient 
causes of our justification-God and ourselves-and hence we cannot on 
this view sufficiently cause our own justification. If God's action is neces-
sary, then our action alone is not sufficient. Still, we could read the Second 
Council of Orange as affirming that no action of ours can have any sort of 
causal role--even if not a sufficient causal role-in justification. In this 
case, the version of synergism that I am considering here would indeed 
amount to Pelagianism. 
I think it is important to keep in mind that nothing about the statements 
made by the Council implies one of these readings over and above the 
other. Why should anyone adopt the stronger reading? One answer that 
certain theolOgians in the past have favored is simply that if our own free 
acceptance is required for justification, then God's grace is not wholly reli-
able. Still, this answer depends on an acceptance of the doctrine of the irre-
sistibility of grace, and for the purposes of this discussion I am not presup-
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posing such a doctrine-indeed, I am proceeding as if this doctrine is false. 
It seems to me that the question of the absolute reliability of divine grace is 
on the face of it a question independent of Pelagianism.5 
Another reason for adopting the stronger reading may go something 
like this. The offer of grace, and our acceptance of it, are sequentially 
ordered parts of a process. In one sense an element in a process is not suf-
ficient for the outcome of that process; it is merely necessary. Still, some-
one could insist that the element is sufficient for the outcome given the 
causally prior parts of the process. It is precisely this intuition, I think, that 
motivates some theologians to believe that any theology that allows for an 
independent act of accepting grace will turn out to be Pelagian. The 
thought is a mistake, since the sequential nature of the causal cooperation 
does not prevent it from being cooperation, and hence does not require 
that an action later in the process is any sense a sufficient cause of the 
effect. So it seems to me that synergism amounts to Pelagianism only if it 
is felt that any ascription of a causal role to human activity in justifica-
tion~ven if not a sufficient causal role-is Pelagian. And it is not clear 
that the Second Council of Orange requires this view. 
IV 
Suppose, however, that we do adopt such a rigid reading of anti-
Pelagianism, and require for orthodoxy that there can be no natural active 
human cooperation in justification. Would such a position require us to 
accept the irresistibility of grace? I doubt it; and seeing how we can avoid 
the irresistibility of grace even given a rejection of synergism brings me to 
my next three possible anti-Pelagian options-the third, fourth, and fifth of 
the seven I propose in all. It seems to me that it would be possible to hold 
both that no naturally caused act of acceptance is required in order for 
divine grace to be received by the person to be justified, and that grace can 
nevertheless be resisted. The basic idea is that, in the case of someone 
whom God has chosen for justification, the reception of grace is, as it were, 
the default position; grace is received automatically unless the person 
places some active bar or block on the reception of grace-that is to say, 
unless the person actively resists the grace. 
I am going to suppose-for my next three anti-Pelagian options-that 
for a person p to accept grace is for p not to resist the bodily execution of 
some action a, somehow resistibly brought about by God in p. For the the-
ory, it does not matter what a consist in, but let me for now claim that a 
must be a morally good action, or one which would have been morally 
good if brought about by merely creaturely agency. If we hold that justifi-
cation consist in explicit faith, we will want to say something slightly dif-
ferent from what I am about to propose. I shall consider the explicit faith 
option later. 
All three of the theologies that I am about to propose require us to 
accept claims that are in one way or another debatable. The first requires 
us to accept a claim that may be theologically dubious in this anti-Pelagian 
context, namely, that the causal origin of a is an inclination internal to the 
agent-though unlike the synergistic position considered in the previous 
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section, this inclination is entirely supernatural, irresistibly given by God. 
The second and third require the philosophically controversial notion of an 
interior act of will, distinct from any exterior act. 
The first of these-my third anti-Pelagian option-posits that the rele-
vant action is the causal result of a supernatural inclination. Such an incli-
nation would be (irresistibly) given by God to a person, such that the incli-
nation is sufficient-unless-impeded for the action. The performance of the 
action counts as the acceptance of grace. I understand an inclination here 
to be a positive tendency to perform an act, such that, if nothing intervenes, 
the act is brought about. On this sort of view, an inclination is not itself an 
act, and acting in accordance with the inclination does not require any kind 
of further causal cooperation on the part of the agent: it does not require the 
agent to will or choose the relevant action a, though it does require that the 
agent not deliberately will/ choose/ do something other than a.6 The action 
would nevertheless count as the relevant human person's action, since it is 
brought about by something internal to the person, namely, the inclination. 
A close example may make things clearer. Consider a generally invol-
untary but controllable act such as blinking. My blinking goes on automat-
ically: I do not usually will it, or consciously cause it. But I can prevent it if 
I wish, at least for a time; indeed, I can deliberately cause it too. I take it, in 
fact, that I have a (natural) inclination to blink, and the inclination is causal-
ly sufficient for the action.7 I am supposing that acting in accordance with 
the relevant divinely-given inclination will be like this, and this amounts to 
my third anti-Pelagian strategy: the God-given inclination is sufficient-
unless-impeded for an action a that constitutes the acceptance of grace, and 
this sufficiency means that the creature does not need to will or choose a, or 
in some other way further causally cooperate in a (over and above the 
causally sufficient role played by the inclination).8 
On this view, the action certainly belongs to the agent, since it is caused 
by some inclination internal to the agent. But it is a divinely-originated 
inclination, internal to the agent, that is sufficient (unless impeded) for the 
action. The agent brings no causal contribution of his or her own other 
than the divinely-originated inclination. Still, it may be felt that any causal 
contribution to the action, internal to the agent, entails some sort of syner-
gism. For whether or not the inclination is natural or divinely-endowed in 
some special way, it is still the agent's inclination, and to this extent is still a 
causal contribution that is proper to the agent, and as such independent of 
direct divine causal activity in the performance of the act. So my next two 
options dispense with such an internal origin altogether. 
My fourth anti-Pelagian strategy posits straightforwardly that the rele-
vant action a is brought about directly by God-and not by means of (say) 
an inclination. God brings about the bodily motion in which some act a 
consists. This strategy, along with the fifth, that I consider in a moment, 
requires the notion of an interior act of will, such that the agent's willing a is 
distinct from the agent's doing a. The fourth anti-Pelagian strategy involves 
the distinctive claim that the agent's not-willing/ choosing/ doing not-a 
consists in the agent's willing a. Could an agent will a and yet there be 
some sense in which the agent is not responsible for doing a, or in which 
the agent's willing is not a causally necessary condition for a's being done? 
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There seem to me to be two options consistent with an affirmative answer 
to these questions. Ex hypothesi, a is brought about by God. So the first 
option is that God sever whatever causal mechanisms obtain between the 
interior act-willing a-and the exterior act-doing a. The choosing or 
willing does not have any causal role, for God's action remains sufficient-
unless-impeded. The creature's choosing or willing is counterfactually suf-
ficient, as we might say: it would have been sufficient were God not causal-
ly responsible for bringing about the bodily execution of the action. The 
second option is simply that a is causally overdetermined, brought about 
sufficiently by God, and sufficiently by the created agent. Clearly, we can 
on this understanding claim both that a is brought about by God, and that 
a is brought about by the creature; on this option, we would need to assert 
that a is salvific merely in the case that it is true that a is brought about by 
God, irrespective of the truth of the claim that a is brought about by the 
creature.9 So the relevant salvific claim is that a is brought about by God, 
and thus Pelagianism, even on the rigidly anti-synergistic understanding 
that I am considering here, is avoided. 
This may all seem implausible, and if it does, then the notion of an act of 
will can be used to develop a further anti-Pelagian strategy-my fifth-
that allows for the resistibility of grace. On this fifth strategy, the act a itself 
is simply brought about by God, without any causal origin in the person, 
or any interior act of will for a on the part of the person. The created per-
son wills neither a nor not-a: the person's will is simply indifferent to a. In 
distinction from the fourth anti-Pelagian view, the person does not will a at 
all, though in line with the views considered thus far in this section, the 
fifth view maintains that willing not-a constitutes resisting grace. On this 
fifth view, as on the fourth, God moves the person like a puppet: God 
brings about the bodily motions in which some act a consists. But unlike 
the fourth view, the person thus moved has no act of will of his own at all. 
This avoids the claim that the action is at all an action of the creature. But 
the divine motion can be sufficient-unless-impeded for a. For, prior to a, 
the creature can will, choose, or do not-a (in some sense of 'prior,' for if a is 
really prevented, there is no act for the impeding act to be prior to).H! 
Perhaps on this view a will not be a morally good act: but it could be coun-
terfactually good (as we lnight say)-it would have been good had it been 
brought about by merely creaturely agency.ll Note that my fourth and 
fifth anti-Pelagian strategies are combinable: not-willing not-a could consist 
either in willing a, or in being wholly indifferent about a, willing neither a 
nor not-a-and a combined theory would allow for both possibilities. 
It is worth pausing here to consider a little more closely precisely what it 
is that I am proposing. It might be thought that the concession that a per-
son can impede God's bringing about a in her by preemptively doing not-a 
somehow makes her salvation wholly up to her after all, since God's doing 
a is still dependent on her not doing not-a. My proposal, however, is that 
her doing not-a at a time t simply prevents God from bringing about a at in 
her t, provided that God does not coercively prevent her from doing not-a. 
This amounts to a kind of Augustinianism: damnation is, and salvation is 
not, something which is brought about by the creature. God can, of course, 
make it hard for her to do not-a (perhaps by giving her an inclination not to 
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do not-a). But that is another question. 
Is the view that a person can impede God's action by somehow "getting 
there first" a plausible view of resistance? It is, in the sense that not doing 
not-a is necessary for God's doing a; and what is necessary in this case is 
just the creature's refraining from acting. Equally, resistance does not need 
to be conscious. But if this be felt to be unsatisfactory, a more nuanced 
view is available. After all, if the relevant action is of a kind that would, if 
brought about by the creature independently, count as a moral action-as I 
am supposing-then it is likely to be a complex and drawn out activity, 
consisting of more than one stage. And if it is the sort of action that takes a 
reasonable amount of time, then opportunities for resistance arise through-
out-right Up to the moment at which the action is completed. There is no 
reason for the resistance of grace not to be like this. 
Consider a related example. Suppose someone moves me in such-and-
such a way-perhaps (taking a crude example) I wake up to find myself 
traveling in an ambulance. Suppose too that I have, all the time that I am 
conscious of being in the ambulance, the option not to be there. Perhaps I 
can simply ask the driver to stop and let me out. If I do not do this, then I 
do not impede the action that is done to me-being brought to hospital, or 
whatever. But-by the same token-I do not causally contribute to it, 
other than counterfactually (i.e. by not impeding it). Does not-impeding a 
amount to wanting or doing a? Not generally, given the coherence of the 
notion of an interior act of will, for given this it is possible to accept that 
there are many things that I, for example, neither impede nor want--even 
in the case that I can impede them. If I do not do something, I remain in 
the ambulance. But it would be odd to describe this as a case of my going 
to the hospital (as opposed to being brought there). 
None of this, of course, entails that God is the causal origin of all moral-
ly good works-though we certainly could claim this if we wished. 
Neither do we have to commit ourselves to the position that God offer 
grace to all-though of course such a position is certainly possible. The 
point about any morally good work not brought about as the direct result 
of divine grace is that such a work cannot be relevant to the process of jus-
tification.12 
Thus far, I have supposed that the acceptance of grace consists in the 
bodily execution of some factually or counterfactually good act. 
Traditionally, of course, grace and the acceptance of grace are closely tied 
to the notion of faith. Suppose, for example, that justifying grace consists, 
or could consist, in divinely-originated faith.13 Since I am supposing that 
grace is resistible, I need such faith to be a voluntary matter. I thus need to 
posit that faith consists in, or results from, some sort of interior act of will 
distinct from any exterior act-distinct, in other words, from any bodily 
execution of an act. My last two anti-Pelagian strategies make precisely 
these presuppositions. 
These two final strategies correspond respectively to the third and fifth 
strategies just outlined. According to the sixth anti-Pelagian strategy, God 
gives someone an inclination to an act of faith, such that the inclination is 
sufficient-unless-impeded for the interior act of faith. The account then 
goes through exactly as for the third anti-Pelagian strategy, with the excep-
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tion that the inclination is for an interior act, not for the bodily execution of 
some act. According to the seventh anti-Pelagian strategy, God's direct 
action is sufficient-unless-impeded for the interior act of faith-as for the 
fifth anti-Pelagian strategy, mutatis mutandis.14 I do not need to adjudicate 
on what precisely saving faith might consist in. But I take it that, since on 
the view I am defending faith is a voluntary matter, it is more likely to con-
sist in trust (in the offered salvation-fiducia, in the technical theological 
jargon) than in belief in certain propositions. After all, bcZieving is on the 
face of it a state, not something subject to direct voluntary controL" 
*** 
1£ I am right, there is a variety of different views open to someone who 
wants to hold both that all forms of Pelagianism are false and that grace is 
resistible. It may be thought that in proposing these views, I am overlook-
ing one of the fundamental motivations for the view that grace is irre-
sistible, namely, the sheer difficulty of acting well (i.e. in accordance with the 
prompting of divine grace). In reply, I would suggest that the views I con-
sider here make use of the notions of God's inclining us to act in the rele-
vant ways, or of God's moving us to act in the relevant ways. Someone 
who is not satisfied with these possible answers will need to accept the irre-
sistibility of grace with all the attendant difficulties of that view. In any 
case, if we want to hold that God saves sumers, not just saints, we will prob-
ably need to make the moral requirements of salvation rather low, irrespec-
tive of our view on the question of Pelagianism. But that is another issue.16 
Oriel Col/ege, Oxford 
NOTES 
1. That is to say, the Council is not denying that we can perform morally 
good works; merely that any such work can have any sort of causal role in our 
justification. Compare Aquinas's claim that we can perform morally good 
works without grace: Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 109, a. 5 c. Nothing that I rely 
on in my argument here requires this reading, and the reader could adopt, if 
she wished, the stronger claim that we can perform no morally good act with-
out grace. 
2. There is, of course, at least one theory of justification that aims to link it 
logically with the atonement: namely, the Reformed view that, necessarily, jus-
tification consists in the extrinsic imputation of Christ's righteousness. I do not 
know whether such a theory is true; even if it is true, however, my arguments 
here, about the anti-Pelagian structures of certain theologies that admit the 
resistibility of grace, will be untouched. 
3. I add this last clause partly to take account of the common traditional 
view that God has no obligations: see on this, in particular, Thomas V. Morris, 
"Duty and Divine Goodness," American Philosophical Quarterly, 21 (1984): 261-8. 
4. It should go without saying that I am supposing that the individual's 
response here is not causally dependent on any special divine action. If it 
were, of course, then the doctrine would not be semi-Pelagian, since the 
response to the divine promise would be initiated by God, not by a creature. 
ANTI-PELAGIANISM AND RESISTIBILITY OF GRACE 209 
But if the human response were so dependent, the theory would resemble one 
or more of the theories that I discuss below, and it would be hard to see why 
the divine promise was not simply redundant. 
5. The question of the irresistibility of grace is, however, linked with the 
question of divine sovereignty, inasmuch as it is clearly the case that a powerful 
motivation for accepting the irresistibility of grace is a strong doctrine of divine 
sovereignty. If my argument in this paper is correct, then the rejection of 
Pelagianism is in principle independent of the question of divine sovereignty. 
6. Lest there be any doubt about this, I am assuming that whatever view we 
adopt of causation, causal relations are not reducible to constant conjunction, 
and should not be understood merely counterfactually. 1 think that there are 
reliable intuitions about the ways in which particular events and particular 
substances may be connected to each other, and that these intuitions posit 
more robust connections than constant conjunction or mere counterfactual 
dependence. For our commonsense notion is that there are things in the 
world-substances-that are able to cause certain effects, such that there is 
some genuinely explanatory relation-some real linkage-between the cause 
and the effect. Neither constant conjunction nor counterfactual dependence 
maintains such a connection. A definition of causation that is faithful to our 
intuitions on the matter would have to include the fact that a cause seems to 
make some genuine contribution to the effect: something that the cause is or 
does is responsible for the effect; the effect somehow derives from the cause. 
7. It will not make much difference to my account whether or not we think 
of blinking as an action. Blinking could be merely an event; but deliberately 
resisting the inclination to blink is surely an action. 
8. There is, of course, a distinction between blinking and the type of action 
that could be relevant to the acceptance of grace. Blinking is not only involun-
tary but for the most part unconscious. There is no reason to suppose that the 
acceptance of grace need be thus unconscious; indeed, the kind of complex 
moral action that would be relevant in this case would certainly be something 
that the agent would be aware of-though, of course, the agent need not be 
aware that the action would be salvific. Virtuous habits would be analogous: 
someone acts in accordance with such a habit unless she actively resists; but 
she nevertheless would certainly be consciously aware of the action thus 
brought about. She would not act virtuously merely through negligence, as it 
were. Pari passu, the I?erson accepting grace would not act in accordance with 
the inclination through negligence, even if such a person were not aware that 
the act thus brought about counted as the acceptance of divinely-offered grace. 
9. We may not, on this view, need to exploit the notion of an act of will at 
all, simply asserting that a is done by God and that a is done by the creature, 
irrespective of any account of the causal mechanisms involved. But 1 am not 
sure about this. 
10. This account does not entail, of course, that prior to a there has to be 
some sort of act of will or choice for a. So there are no problems of causal 
regress here. (lowe this point, along with some of the material in this section, 
to Thomas Williams.) The fact that there does not need to be an act of will or 
choice for a prior to a allows acceptance not to be prior to the offer of grace: the 
offer of grace to a person is God's moving her body, and acceptance is not 
resisting; this non-resistance is not prior to God's moving the person's body. 
11. We could perhaps claim that the action is good, and that it is in some 
very loose sense the creature's action, in the sense that the creature does not 
resist its being brought about in him. 
12. Does the belief that someone justified could merit (further) reward from 
God entail any form of Pelagianism (as Protestants have often asserted against 
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Catholics)? I do not see that it should do. The Pelagian claim is that we some-
how cause our own salvation, and ex hypothesi this is not what is caused by the 
good works of someone who is already justified. Catholic views concerning 
the sacrament of penance (confession) may require more work. After all, it is 
certainly an acceptable Catholic view that contrition is required for the restora-
tion of justification. But this could easily be covered by the theory I am 
proposing here, namely that God can cause works (though not such that we 
cannot resist this causal influence), the performance of which constitutes the 
acceptance of justifying grace. Contrition could be just such a work. 
Protestants may find Catholic talk of gaining and losing justification puzzling. 
But this puzzlement springs ultimately from the Reformed view that justifica-
tion consists in the extrinsic imputation of Christ's righteousness-and this is 
not an issue that I want or need to discuss here. My positions are on the whole 
independent of any specific theory of the atonement. One necessary precondi-
tion for the view that someone justified could merit further reward from God 
is that there are supererogatory works, and there may be arguments against 
the possibility of such works-though I do not know of a successful one. 
13. I say 'could consist', because these theories can easily be combined with 
any of those just adumbrated. 
14. There is no correlate to the fourth strategy here, because on the view 1 
am considering faith is a voluntary matter, and thus an interior act. And there 
can be no interior act of wanting to have faith that is distinct from having faith. 
(I do not mean that someone could not say [and mean] that she wants to have 
faith but cannot. This is surely a way of saying that she holds certain overrid-
ing beliefs that are incompatible with Christian faith.) 
15. I am grateful to William Hasker, and to an anonymous referee for Faith 
and Philosophy, for this point. It is perhaps worth keeping in mind that even 
Catholic theologians make space for the notion of trust in the understanding of 
justifying faith: see e.g. Aquinas's discussion at Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 2, a. 2. 
16. Thanks to Thomas Williams, Keith Ward, and the editor and two anony-
mous referees of this journal. 
